Fordham Law Review
Volume 46

Issue 6

Article 7

1978

I Swear That I'm Guilty, So Help Me God: The Oath in Rule 11
Proceedings
Margaret M. Vaughan

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Margaret M. Vaughan, I Swear That I'm Guilty, So Help Me God: The Oath in Rule 11 Proceedings, 46
Fordham L. Rev. 1242 (1978).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol46/iss6/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

I SWEAR THAT I'M GUILTY, SO HELP ME
GOD: THE OATH IN RULE 1.1 PROCEEDINGS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The manner of accepting guilty pleas in the federal courts is governed by
rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1 In 1975, pursuant to a
3
proposal by the Supreme Court, 2 Congress extensively amended that rule.
'
4
While the amended version of rule 11 is "[s]ymptomatic of the change from
the neglect that nontrial adjudication had previously received from the
legislature and the judiciary, it is not free from all problems.
Most of the controversial provisions of rule 11 have received extensive
analysis, both critical and supportive, from legislators and commentators. 5
The related provisions of rules 11(c)(5) 6 and 11(e)(6), 7 however, have not been
subjected to scrutiny, although they have been recognized to be troublesome.8
These provisions merit attention because their implementation may effectively

1. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
2. The Supreme Court proposal is set out in Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of
CriminalProcedurefor the United States District Courts, 62 F.R.D. 271 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Proposed Amendments].
3. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, §
3(5)-(10), 89 Stat. 370, 371-72 (amending Fed. R. Crim. P. 11); Hoffman, Pleas of Guilty in the
Federal Courts, 22 Prac. Law. 11, 11 (No. 6, Sept. 1, 1976). For a brief discussion of the
amendments to rule 11, see Hungate, Changes in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 61
A.B.A.J. 1203 (1975).
4. Note, Revised Federal Rule 11: Tighter Guidelines for Pleas in Criminal Cases, 44
Fordham L. Rev. 1010, 1010 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Plea Bargaining].
5. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 3; Hungate, supra note 3 ; Plea Bargaining,supra note 4
Comment, Pleading Guilty: Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 and the New Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11, 1975 U. Ill. L.F. 116 [hereinafter cited as Pleading Guilty]; Note, Rule 11
and Collateral Attack on Guilty Pleas, 86 Yale L.J. 1395 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Collateral
Attack].
6. Rule 11(c)(5) provides that the court must advise the defendant "that if he pleads guilty or
nolo contendere, the court may ask him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and
if he answers these questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his
answers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement." Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(c)(5).
7. Rule 11(e)(6) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidence of a plea
of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo
contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with,
and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal
proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. However, evidence of a statement
made in connection with, and relevant to, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo
contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime,
is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by
the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel." Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(e)(6).
8. See Plea Bargaining, supra note 4, at 1025-27.
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thwart the very purposes of the amendments to rule 11, 9 by discouraging the
disposition of criminal cases by guilty plea.' 0
This Note will examine the perjury sanction provided by rule 11(e)(6) and
its counterpart, rule 11(c)(5), in order to determine whether these provisions
are necessary and/or desirable. It will scrutinize the practice of placing the
defendant under oath" during the rule 11 proceeding 12 in order to determine
whether that procedure is justified in light of the policies and practices
involved in pleading guilty. In addition, it will examine the nature of the rule
11 colloquy 13 in order to ascertain whether Congress and the courts, in their
attempts to protect the rights of the uninformed defendant, have not, in
effect, curtailed some rights of the counseled and intelligent defendant who
desires to enter an advantageous plea of guilty without being subjected to
extensive personal inquisition by the court.
II.

GUILTY PLEAS AND RULE 11 GENERALLY

In recent years guilty pleas have become an increasingly more common
means of disposing of criminal cases. 14 In federal courts, the vast majority of
defendants against whom indictments or informations are filed plead guilty,"5
and it is generally acknowledged that these defendants are entitled to know
16
the consequences and ramifications of their admissions of guilt.
A guilty plea carries many advantages for both the defendant and the
Government. 17 However, it also entails a waiver by the defendant of impor9. The rule 11 amendments were designed to: (1) ensure that guilty pleas are intelligently
entered, Proposed Amendments, supra note 2, at 277 (Advisory Committee Note); (2) officially
recognize plea bargaining and grant it some judicial supervision, id.; and, (3) facilitate and
finalize the disposition of criminal cases by guilty plea, H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
37, reprintedin [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 674, 708 (separate views of Representatives

Holtzman and Drinan).
10.

See notes 96, 102 infra and accompanying texL

11. The custom of placing a defendant under oath when he enters a guilty plea has been
tacitly accepted as an appropriate procedure. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Lewis, S46 F.2d 566 (4th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977); Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974). This implied sanction notwithstanding, the practice has never
been thoroughly analyzed. Its propriety, however, is suspect, particularly in light of the nature of

the plea proceedings conducted in the federal courts under rule 11.
12. Under rule 11, a plea hearing must be conducted before a guilty plea may be accepted.
Fed. R Crim. P. 11.
13. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c), (d), (f).
14. Surveys indicate that 80-95% of all criminal cases are disposed of by guilty pleas. See
Pugh, Ruminations Re Reform of American Criminal Justice (Especially Our Guilty Plea Sys-

tem): Reflections Derivedfrom a Study of the French System, 36 La. L. Rev. 947, 948 (1976);
Note, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of "Present but Unknowable" ConstitutionalRights: The
Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1435, 1435 n.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Guilty Plea as Waiver]; Plea Bargaining,supra note 4, at 1010 n.2; PleadingGuilty, supra note 5,
at 117.

15.
16.

Hoffman, supra note 3, at 12.
Id.

17.

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1971); United States v. Bambulas, 571 F.2d 525,
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tant constitutional rights "including his privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his
accusers."1 s Not insensitive to the precarious position of a defendant who
indicates willingness to admit his guilt, Congress, in 1966, revised the original
version of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 9 This revised
version required that a court, in accepting a plea of guilty, personally address
the defendant to determine whether the plea is "made voluntarily with
' 20
understanding of the nature of the charge and -the consequences of the plea."
2
1
Subsequently, the Supreme Court rendered two major decisions, in which it
expressed its concern that plea proceedings be conducted in a manner that
ensures the protection of the defendant's rights. In Boykin v. Alabama,2 2 the
Court set out minimum constitutional standards for plea proceedings in all
jurisdictions. 23 In McCarthy v. United States, 24 the Court held that strict
compliance with rule 11, as it then stood, 25 was mandatory in the federal
courts. In these decisions, the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that a
26
defendant, by pleading guilty, waives fundamental constitutional rights,
and it directed that the record of the plea proceeding show that the defendant
was aware of his rights and that he waived them intelligently and voluntarily. 2 7 McCarthy and Boykin demonstrate the duty of the courts to protect the
526 (10th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). For a comprehensive enumeration of the various advantages
derived from guilty pleas, see Pleading Guilty, supra note 5, at 117.
18. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 243 (1969); Thundershield v. Solem, 429 F. Supp. 944, 949 & n.3 (D.S.D.), qff'd, 565
F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1977); Note, The Waivability by Guilty Plea of Retroactively Endowed
ConstitutionalRights, 41 Alb. L. Rev. 115, 117 n.14 (1977); 33 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 223, 224
(1976). For a list of the numerous waivers involved in pleading guilty, see Bishop, Waivers in
Pleas of Guilty, 60 F.R.D. 513 (1973). Prior to the enactment of amended rule 11, the following
observation was made: "A guilty plea is the most devastating waiver of rights known in American
criminal law, yet it rates less protection than a confession." Note, The Supreme Court's Changed
View of the Guilty Plea, 4 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 79, 79 (1973).
19. Prior to 1966, rule 11 provided: "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the
consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuise to accept a plea of guilty, and shall
not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding
of the nature of the charge. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea
of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty."
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, 18 U.S.C. app. at 3748 (1964) (amended 1966, 1975).
20. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, 18 U.S.C. app. at 4489 (1970) (amended 1975).
21. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969).
22. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
23. In Boykin, the Supreme Court refused to presume a waiver of a defendant's constitutional
rights. It required an affirmative showing, on the record, that the defendant had voluntarily and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right
to confront his accusers. Id. at 243-44.
24. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
25. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
26. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
27. "We cannot presume a waiver of these ... important federal rights from a silent record,"
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 243.
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defendant who is disposed to admit
his guilt against infringement of his
28
constitutional and statutory rights.
In a series of later decisions, however, the Supreme Court appeared to shift
its emphasis from the protection of basic constitutional rights to the "orderly
conduct of the judicial system and the maintenance of any plea bargain that
[may have] been struck. ' 29 It expressly sanctioned the plea bargaining process
and afforded it some judicial supervision. 30 The Court further manifested its
approval and concern for the proper administration of plea negotiations in its
proposals to amend rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 31
In response to these developments, Congress substantially revised rule 11.32
The amendments were intended to legitimize plea bargaining, to ensure its
proper administration, 3 3 and to codify the constitutional requirements for
34
taking guilty pleas set out in Boykin.
Rule 11, as amended, expands the personal discussion which must take
place between the presiding judge and the defendant. 3" Under the rule, the
judge must not only determine that the defendant understands the nature of
the charges against him and the penalties provided by law, but he must also
expressly inform the defendant of them. 36 The rule also requires that the court
make "such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the
plea."' 37 Although there is no explicit requirement that the judge address the
38
postdefendant personally in order to establish the requisite factual basis,
28.

See Note, The Supreme Court's Changed View of the Guilty Plea, 4 Mem. St. U.L. Rev.

79, 79-82 (1973).

29. Id. at 85; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). The rule that emerged from these
companion cases appeared to be that a defendant's admission in open court that he has committed
the crime charged would sustain a waiver of present, although unknowable, constitutional rights.
In these cases the Court demonstrated its reluctance to upset guilty pleas. Recent dictum reveals
the Court's persistence in its interest in the finality of convictions. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 71 (1977).

30.

See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).

31.

Proposed Amendments, supra note 2, at 275-77.

32.

See note 3 supra and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the amendments to

rule 11, see Plea Bargaining, supra note 4.

33. See 121 Cong. Rec. 23321 (1975); Plea Bargaining, supra note 4, at 10l.
34. H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 674, 679; see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 242-43; Hoffman, supra note 3, at 13.
35. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c), (d), (f). The 1966 version of the rule required merely that the
judge personally address the defendant to ascertain that the plea was voluntarily entered. See
note 20 supra and accompanying text.
36. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c). This provision lists a number of specific items of which the court
must personally advise the defendant and secure his understanding, including the maximum and
minimum penalties for the crime charged, his right to be represented by counsel, and the fact that
by pleading guilty he waives his right to trial and the rights he would have at such a trial. Id.
37. Fed. R- Crim. P. 11(f). Under the 1966 version of the rule, no such inquiry was required.
See Fed. R Crim. P. 11, 18 U.S.C. app. at 4489 (1970) (amended 1975); Plea Bargaining, supra
note 4, at 1021.
38. The Advisory Committee has suggested that a factual basis for the plea may be estab-
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McCarthy cases have required demonstration, on the record, that the judge
has satisfied himself as to the existence of a factual basis for the plea, 39 and
most concerned district judges now seek to address40the defendant personally
on this issue before making their determinations.
In view of McCarthy,41 it has been forecast that the Supreme Court will
probably require strict compliance by the district courts with rule 11, as
amended. 42 In anticipation of such a mandate, several circuit courts of
appeals have held that federal plea proceedings must now conform literally to
the provisions of the new rule. 4 3 These cases are the logical consequence of
the dictates of the Supreme Court and of Congress, which specifically
enumerated the rights and waivers of which the defendant must be apprised. 44 However, this strict standard, particularly with respect to rule
lished by extrinsic evidence. "An inquiry might be made of the defendant, of the attorneys for the
government and the defense, of the presentence report when one is available, or by whatever
means is appropriate in a specific case." Proposed Amendments, supra note 2, at 286 (Advisory
Committee Note). See also United States v. Navedo, 516 F.2d 293, 298 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975);
Commentary to ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.6 (Approved Draft 1968).
39. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Irizarry v. United States, 508 F.2d
960, 967 (2d Cir. 1974). "It would seem likely that the new language is meant to clarify the point
that the judge's satisfaction as to factual basis cannot be based on facts privately known or
subjectively believed by him, but must be founded on an objective factual inquiry developed on
the record." Plea Bargaining, supra note 4, at 1022.
40. See Barkai, Accuracy Inquiriesfor All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas
but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 88, 119 n.200, 135-36 (1977). The technique of
"having the accused describe the conduct that gave ri;e to the charge" has been specifically
recommended by the Supreme Court. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
Similarly, it has been suggested that a court's "inquir[y] into a defendant's understanding of the
nature of the charge against him . . . requires an explanation of the basic acts that must be
proved in order to establish guilt." United States v. Brogan, 519 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir.) (McCree,
J.,dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1035 (1975).
41. The decision in McCarthy v. United States turned on statutory, rather than on constitutional, grounds. 394 U.S. at 464. It indicates the Court's willingness to honor and abide by
legislative commands that may afford more than minimum constitutional protection.
42. Pleading Guilty, supra note 5, at 131.
43. United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. !976); United States v. Boone, 543 F.2d
1090 (4th Cir. 1976); cf. United States v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 70 (1977) (requirement of strict compliance with rule I1(c) implied in dictum, where court
stated that rule 11(e) "is a salutary rule, and district courts are required to act in substantial
compliance with it although, as in the case of other subdivisions of Rule 11 [e.g., rule 11(c)],
ritualistic compliance is not required").
44. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c); see H.R. Conf. Rep. No 414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted
in[1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 713, 714. The Advisory Committee had proposed a more
permissive approach to certain provisions of rule 11(c). It suggested that, after advising the
defendant of his right to plead not guilty, the district court "may want to explain some of the
aspects of trial such as the right to confront witnesses, to subpoena witnesses, to testify in his own
behalf, or, if he chooses, not to testify," but that the scope of the warnings "required, in this
respect ... is left to future case-law development." Proposed Amendments, supra note 2, at 280
(Advisory Committee Note). Congress, however, rejected this approach in favor of a mandatory
one. United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1976).
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11(c)(5), has proven difficult to apply as a practical matter. 46 The courts,
especially those in which a guilty pleader is not customarily placed under
oath, have had to strain to reach a fair and just result without undermining
the generally accepted standard of strict compliance with rule 11. 4 7 These
difficulties raise serious questions as to the expediency of rule 11(c)(5).

M.

ANOMALOUS

RULE

11(c)(5)

Congress considered it "only fair that the defendant be warned that his...
statements made in connection with [a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or an
offer to plead guilty] could later be used against him in a perjury trial if made
under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel. " 48 Therefore, it
included that warning in the litany of admonitions which must be given every
49
defendant under rule 11(c).
Rule 11 does not require that the defendant be placed under oath when he
enters a plea of guilty.50 Rule 11(c), however, is phrased in mandatory
terms,5 1 and nowhere does the legislative history of the rule express an
intention to exclude the rule 11(c)(5) 5 2 warning in those cases in which the

defendant is not, in fact, placed under oath during the course of the plea
proceeding. This poses no procedural problems when the defendant is actually

sworn. There the mandate is clear. Unless the defendant is advised that he

45. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
46. The problems in enforcing a strict standard of literal compliance with rule 11 are
evidenced by the shift in standards applied by the courts. Preamendment pleas were governed by
a standard of substantial compliance. See, e.g., Kloner v. United States, 535 F.2d 730, 733-34 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976) (totality of circumstances test). Following the adoption of
the amendments to rule 11, courts announced the applicability of a strict standard of literal
compliance, see, e.g., United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Boone, 543 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1976), but in response to various challenges to pleas on the basis
that the strict standard was not met, courts have tended to find that a lesser standard, by which a
defendant may be found to have been aware of his rights despite the fact that he was not
specifically informed of them by the judge, is permissible, see, e.g., United States v. Hamilton,
568 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073,
1078-79 (2d Cir. 1977). It appears from the most recent decisions on the issue that the applicable
standard may be developing from one of literal compliance to one of "substantive compliance."
See United States v. Alejandro, 569 F.2d 1200, 1202 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
47. See notes 70-74 infra and accompanying text.
48. H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 674, 679.
49. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5); see note 6 supra.
50. The Committee on the Judiciary has stated that it "does not intend its language to be
construed as mandating or encouraging the swearing-in of the defendant during proceedings in
connection with the disclosure and acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement." H.R. Rep. No.
247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 n.9, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 674, 680 n.9.
5I. Rule 11(c) provides that "[blefore accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court
must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he
understands, the following .
Fed. R Crim. P. 11(c) (emphasis supplied).
52. See note 6 supra.
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may be subjected to a perjury prosecution if he testifies falsely, his plea will
3
be invalid."
Many district courts, however, do not customarily place a defendant under
oath when he enters a guilty plea. Nevertheless, appellate courts in such
jurisdictions have felt constrained, by the mandatory nature of rule 11(c), to
hold that the defendant must be advised of each and every provision of the
rule, including 1 1(c)(5). 54 This firm stand, taken shortly after the amendments
to rule 11 became effective,"5 has posed a serious dilemma for reviewing
courts, when the only deficiency in the record is the district court's failure to
advise the defendant in accordance with rule 11(c)(5). The problem is aptly
illustrated by several decisions of the Second Circuit.
In United States v. Journet,56 the Second Circuit reversed a conviction
predicated upon a plea of guilty because of the district court's failure to
comply literally with rule 11, as amended. The court held that "unless the
defendant is specifically informed of each and every element enumerated in
Rule 11 the plea must be vacated. '5 7 It then proceeded to list the items which
the district judge had failed to bring to the defendant's attention. Among
other things, the court found that the examining judge had neglected to advise
the defendant "that if he should decide to plead guilty the court would have
the right to ask him questions under oath about the offense, in which event, if
he should give untrue answers, his statements under oath could be used
against him in a prosecution for perjury."5 8 Despite its acknowledgement that
the district courts within the Second Circuit do not usually swear a defendant
in during plea proceedings,5 9 the court concluded that rule 11(c)(5) clearly
entitled the defendant to be advised of the above matters before pleading
53. Although the warning may not be necessary constitutionally, it would clearly be required
under the strict compliance standard adopted in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
54. See United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Boone, 543
F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1976). In both cases, guilty pleas; that were accepted shortly after the
amendments to rule 11 became effective were struck down. The district courts in both instances
had failed to inform the defendants of several elements of rule 11(c), including the possible
perjury sanction. The courts found the rule 1 (c)(5) advice to be required at the plea proceeding.
Nevertheless, both courts expressed reservations about vacating an otherwise valid guilty plea
solely for noncompliance with rule 11(c)(5). 544 F.2d at 637 n.6; 543 F.2d at 1092 n.2.
55. The effective date for most of the amendments to rule 11 was December 1, 1975. Rule
11(e)(6), however, became effective on August 1, 1975. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, § 2, 89 Stat. 370.
56. 544 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1976).
57. Id. at 634. In even more emphatic terms, the court reiterated its holding as follows: "We
now hold that, as a minimum, before accepting a guilty plea each district judge must personally
inform the defendant of each and every right and other matter set out in Rule 11. Otherwise the
plea must be treated as a nullity." Id. at 636.
58. Id. at 636-37. The additional warnings that the district judge had failed to give were
"that the 'maximum possible penalty' included a possible life-time parole, that if he should go to
trial upon his not guilty plea [the defendant] would have the right to assistance of counsel at the
trial, that his guilty plea would waive his right against self-incrimination, [and] that if his guilty
plea was accepted no further trial of any kind would be held." Id. at 636 (footnotes omitted).
59. Id. at 637 n.6.
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guilty. 60 The court based its decision on the ground that Congress, by
mandating a specific procedure to be followed in the acceptance of guilty
pleas, clearly intended that the courts comply strictly6 1with the adopted
standards, and that deviations should not be tolerated.
The Journet decision caused understandable concern within the Second
Circuit. In view of the firm language of that opinion, the validity of numerous
guilty pleas entered between the effective date of rule 11(c) and the date on
which Journet was decided6 2 were conceivably jeopardized merely because
district judges had neglected to inform defendants of an inapplicable perjury
sanction.
The panel that decided Journet apparently recognized the potential effect of
its decision. Although it continued to insist that strict compliance with rule
11(c) was essential, it supplemented its opinion as originally filed 63 with a
footnote, in which it acknowledged that the district courts within its jurisdiction do not customarily place a defendant under oath when he pleads guilty,
but nevertheless deemed it "advisable" to give the rule 1l(c)(5) warning in all
cases, in order to ensure full compliance with the congressional mandate.6
This apparent afterthought intimated that the court might bend the literal
compliance standard, at least with respect to rule 1 l(c)(5). In fact, the court
subsequently relied upon this footnote to uphold a guilty plea in United States
v. Michaelson.65 Michaelson appealed from a denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea entered during the course of a trial and prior to the decision
in Journet.66 He alleged several grounds of error, including the district court's
noncompliance with the technical requirements of rule 11 in accepting his
plea.67 In that case the defendant was neither advised of his privilege against
self-incrimination nor informed that his answers to the court's questions could
60. Id. at 637.
61. Id. at 635-36. Under the general language of the 1966 version of rule 11, the court of
appeals had held that the record of the plea proceeding should be viewed in the totality of the
surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether the guilty plea was voluntarily and
intelligently entered. Enumeration of each and every right waived by the pleader was not
required. At that time, however, the court did urge that the district courts adopt a set of
instructions outlining the specific rights to be waived in each case as a means of ensuring
compliance with the rule as it then existed. See Kioner v. United States, 535 F.2d 730, 734 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976). In Journet, the court construed the amendments to rule
11 as material, and found that the procedure instituted by Congress explicitly superseded the
totality of the circumstances approach. 544 F.2d at 635-36.
62. Rule 11(c) became effective on December 1, 1975. See note 55 supra. Journet was decided
on November 1, 1976. 544 F.2d at 633.
63. United States v. Journet, No. 76-1285, slip op. (2d Cir. Nov. 1, 1976).
64. 544 F.2d at 637 n.6. The official version also includes some phraseological changes in the
advice required by rule 11(c)(5). Compare id. at 636-37 with United States v. Journet, No.
76-1285, slip op. at 378 (2d Cir. Nov. 1, 1976). These alterations, however, are immaterial for the
purposes of this Note.
65. 552 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1977).
66. Id. at 474.
67. Id. at 476.
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later be used against him. 68 In dealing with the latter issue, the court of
appeals relied entirely on the allusive footnote appended to the Journet
opinion. 69 The court recognized that the defendant's arguments raised "substantial difficulties" in light of the position taken in Journet.70 Nevertheless, it
construed the Journet note in such a way as to overcome the difficulty posed
by noncompliance with rule 1 1(c)(5), at least when the defendant is not placed
under oath during the plea proceeding. 7 1 Without further explanation, the
court simply stated that to vacate the defendant's guilty plea under the
circumstances presented "would be a needlessly rigid reading of amended Rule
72
11 and of Journet.
The Michaelson decision is, at best, a strained attempt to reconcile a
sensible result with authoritative language that tends to defeat that result.
The decision, however, does not adequately deal with the precedent set by
Journet, despite the court's closing deference to that case. 73 Although it did
68.

Id.

69. Id. at 477. It may be noted that none of the circuit judges reviewing the appeal in
Michaelson were members of the panel that had decided Joarnet. Compare 552 F.2d at 474 with
544 F.2d at 634.
70. 552 F.2d at 477.
71. Id. The court of appeals interpreted the footnote under discussion in the following
manner: "Use of the phrase, 'it is advisible [sic],' indicated some leeway for assessing the failure to
give this advice, at least when [the] defendant was not put under oath before questioning about
his guilty plea." Id.
72. Id. The court's reasoning in this case is perplexing. In discussing the rule 11(c)(5) issue,
the court rejected the Government's arguments that different standards apply when a plea is
taken during, rather than before a trial, and that Journet should not be applied retroactively. The
court stated: "It is unlikely that as a general rule different 'standards' apply under Rule 11
depending upon when a plea is taken. . . .And the argument for non-retroactivity must face the
undeniable fact that Congress did prescribe December 1, 1975 . . .as the effective date of the
amendments to Rule 11." Id. Yet, in upholding the guilty plea despite the district court's failure
to advise the defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination under rule 11(c)(3), the court
stated: "[W]e cannot ignore that the plea here was taken after the trial commenced and before
Journet authoritatively construed the amendments to Rule 11." Id. The Michaelson court was
apparently of the opinion that an automatic application of Journet would yield an unjust result.
But its reluctance to criticize the sweeping language of Journet permits problems similar to those
encountered in Michaelson to persist. Later cases indicate that the court of appeals has overcome
this obstacle by simply declaring Journet inapplicable in circumstances in which it feels that
vacation of a guilty plea would be inappropriate. See United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073, 1081
(2d Cir. 1977), discussed notes 75-77 infra and accompanying text; cf. Del Vecchio v. United
States, 556 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1977) (strict standard of Journet not binding where guilty plea
is collaterally attacked), discussed note 74 infra. See also United States v. Alejandro, 569 F.2d 1200,
1202-03 (2d Cir. 1978) (Hays, J., dissenting).
73. "Our decision therefore is not to be interpreted as overruling Journet in any respect." 552
F.2d at 477-78. This statement contributes nothing to the court's rationale or to the impact of its
decision. Michaelson is clearly irreconcilable with the language of Journet, since Journet expressly rejected the argument that noncompliance with rule I1(c) may be held harmless. 544 F. 2d
at 636; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (harmless error rule). The Michaelson court took cognizance of
this holding, as it was applied to the facts in Journet, but appeared willing to view facts on a
case-by-case basis in determining whether the concept of "harmless error" might be applied. See
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not overrule Journet, the Michaelson
court did substantially modify the
74
express mandate of that decision.
In its most recent decision dealing with this issue, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit again upheld a guilty plea despite the district court's
failure to advise the defendant pursuant to rule 11(c)(5).7 S In fact, this
omission was deemed "inconsequential" by both the court and the defense,
and was dismissed without further discussion.7 6 At the same time, the court
maintained that Journet retains its vitality, and it expressed the hope that
stricter77compliance with rule 11(c) would alleviate similar problems in the
future.
It is evident that in future cases the Second Circuit will not vacate an
otherwise valid guilty plea entered by an unsworn defendant merely because
that defendant was not advised in accordance with the provision of rule
11(c)(5). This is obviously a correct and just result. However, the dubious
552 F.2d at 477. Although it did not rely explicitly on the harmless error concept to affirm
Michaelson's conviction, the court, as is indicated by the outcome of the case, found the district
court's failure to inform the defendant specifically of certain rights to be harmless in that instance.
Moreover, the Michaelson court determined that the advice to be given to the defendant
personally, see note 57 supra and accompanying text, was unnecessary where the defendant was
in a position in which he "must have known his rights." 552 F.2d at 477. Therefore, Michaelson
represents a significant weakening of the Journet holding. The court's closing statement, id. at
477-78, serves only to alert district court judges that strict adherence to the mandates of rule 11 is
the preferred course in accepting guilty pleas. On the other hand, immaterial omissions or
inaccuracies will not necessarily invalidate a plea of guilty.
74. In a subsequent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit characterized
Michaelson as the probable "limit of how far [it] should go in that direction on a direct appeal."
Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1977). Del Vecchio involved a guilty
plea that was entered prior to the effective date of the amendments to rule 11, and a collateral
attack on that plea pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) (commonly referred to as a § 2255
petition), rather than a direct appeal. Id. at 108. In an effort to warn potential petitioners that
their claims would be carefully scrutinized and their pleas upheld if only technical violations of
rule 11 are found, the court, in dictum, discussed the effect of similar collateral attacks. The court
statedi "There should be no doubt after Journet ... that on a direct criminal appeal there will be
little room for minimizing the effect of a failure to comply with Rule 11. . . . But when a
defendant takes no appeal and collaterally attacks the conviction years later . . . different
considerations... come into play." Id. at 109. It stated further that "there must be flexibility in
the collateral review of a Rule 11 claim." Id. at 111. This indicates that § 2255 petitions
constitute yet another exception to the stringent requirements set out in Journet. For the
standards applicable in vacating guilty pleas by a § 2255 petition rather than on direct appeal,
see Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962);
United States v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bachner v. United States, 517 F.2d
589 (7th Cir. 1975) Aviles v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 538 F.2d
307 (2d Cir. 1976).
75. United States v. Sat, 558 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1977). The court found compliance with all
the requirements of rule 11(c), except 11(c)(5). Id. at 1079.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1081 n.10. "While each case must stand on its own, we do not believe we are here
going further than Michaelson, and the problem will shortly disappear as the teachings of Journet
are taken to heart." Id.
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rationale which the court has been constrained to employ in order to reach
that result raises a question as to the value of that provision. There appears to
be no reason for couching rule 11(c)(5) in the same mandatory terms used for
the other rule 11(c) warnings. The advice is wholly irrelevant unless the guilty
plea is taken under oath. In addition, the problems faced in the Second
Circuit may also arise in courts which do place the defendant under oath
during 7the
plea proceeding, if such a defendant should waive his right to
8
counsel.
An even more fundamental problem, however, is posed by the wording of
rule 11(c)(5).7 9 The provision is misleading to the detriment of the defendant.
A district judge who advises a defendant that his statements may be used
against him in a perjury or false statement prosecution if they are made
"under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel," 0 would be acting
in absolute compliance with the statutory mandate. This advice, however,
erroneously implies that unsworn statements made during the plea proceeding
may not be used at all.
Actually, a valid guilty plea and related statements may be introduced into
evidence in both criminal"1 and civil 8 2 trials, and may be used for purposes of
impeachment.8 3 In addition, such evidence may be the basis of a false
statement prosecution, whether or not the statements were made under
oath. 8 4 The admissibility of such evidence is not restricted by rule 11(e)(6), 8"
78.

The perjury sanction is available only when the defendant has made his statement in the

presence of counsel. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5), (e)(6); see notes 6-7 supra.
79. See note 6 supra.
80. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5).
81. See United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950
(1975); Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
82. See Kreps v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1965); Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec.
Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 579 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Bush, Criminal Convictions as Evidence in
Civil Proceedings, 29 Miss. L.J. 276, 283 (1958); Comment, Evidence: Judgments and Pleas in
Prior Criminal Prosecutions as Evidence in Civil Actions, 1962 Duke L.J. 97, 103-07.
83. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). See generally Note, The Ghost of Convictions Past: Impeachment of Witness Credibility, 4 Cap. U.L. Rev. 244 (1975) Note, Impeachment of the Criminal
Defendant by Prior Convictions, 50 Notre Dame Law. 726 (1975); 41 Brooklyn L. Rev. 665
(1975).
84. See note 137 infra and accompanying text.
85. The interpretation which will be given rule 11(e)(6), that is, whether the statute will
actually preclude the use of withdrawn guilty pleas and related statements in any court
proceeding, is, at present, an open question. The Supreme Court held, long before the enactment
of rule 11, that a guilty plea withdrawn by leave of the court is not admissible into evidence In a
subsequent federal court trial on the charge to which the defendant had previously pleaded guilty.
See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927). Rule 11(e)(6) apparently expands upon that
holding by precluding the use of the plea entirely, and the use of related statements, except In
perjury or false statement prosecutions. Fed. R. Crim. P. tl(e)(6); see H.R. Rep. No. 414, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 713, 714.
It has been noted that the new rule is not merely a codification of prior case law, but rather, a
congressional invention. Plea Bargaining,supra note 4, at 1026. This view and the belief that the
statute will be interpreted to exclude much evidence previously admissible are substantiated by
the objections to the provision raised by the Department of Justice, see Hungate, supra note 3, at
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unless the plea of guilty is subsequently withdrawn. 6
For reasons which are unexplained by the legislative history of the rule 11
amendments, Congress directed that the pleader be advised that his sworn
statements may be introduced against him in a prosecution for perjury or false
statement, but failed to provide advice about the more dire consequences that
a guilty plea may carry with respect to subsequent court proceedings.8 7 This
1204, as well as by the amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which eliminated former
language permitting the introduction of related statements for purposes of impeachment, see Act
of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-149, § 1(9), 89 Stat. 805 (amending Fed. R. Evid. 410). Rule
410 previously allowed "the introduction of voluntary and reliable statements made in court on
the record in connection with any [plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or offer to plead guilty] where
offered for impeachment purposes or in a subsequent prosecution of the declarant for perjury or
false statement." Fed. R. Evid. 410, 28 U.S.C. app. at 1968 (Supp. IV 1974) (amended 1975). See
also 121 Cong. Rec. 23322 (1975) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
The extent to which statements made in conjunction with guilty pleas will be admissible has
not yet been definitively decided. A recent decision in the Fourth Circuit, however, indicates that
the provisions of criminal procedure rule 11(e)(6) and evidence rule 410 will be construed
narrowly. In United States v. Mathis, 550 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), the court of
appeals held that statements made at a rule 11 proceeding could be used to impeach the pleader
when he testified as a witness at the trial of another person. The decision was undoubtedly
correct, since the witness' guilty plea in that case had not been withdrawn. The court, however,
may have carried its reasoning a step too far. In interpreting the pertinent statutes, the court
stated: "Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Rule I 1(e)(6), F.R. Crim. P., only prohibit statements
made in conjunction with a guilty plea from being used (1) against the person who made the plea,
and (2) when that person has withdrawn the guilty plea. In the instant case... [tlhe witness had
not withdrawn his guilty plea and the statement was not used against him, but was used
collaterally for purposes of impeachment." Id. at 182 (emphasis supplied). This language indicates
that, in the Fourth Circuit, even statements made in connection with a withdrawn guilty plea
may be admissible for impeachment purposes. Such a construction would drastically limit the
plain meaning of rule 11(e)(6), and would effectively ignore the amendments to rule 410. When the
Senate considered the rule 11 amendments promulgated by the House, it proposed that rule
11(e)(6) be stricken, and that the Federal Rules of Evidence, as they then stood, be left to govern
the admissibility of statements made by a defendant at a plea hearing. See Comparison Between
Proposed Senate Amendment and H.R. 6799, 121 Cong. Rec. 23326 (1975). The fact that the
language permitting the introduction of related statements for purposes of impeachment was
deleted from rule 410 after adoption of the rule 11 amendments indicates that Congress intended
such an introduction to be prohibited.
The dictum in Mathis, therefore, is incorrect. The wording of the relevant statute indicates
that the phrase "against the person who made the plea" refers to the proceeding itself, rather than
to the use to which the statements may be put. See Fed. R. Crim. P. Il(e)(6); Fed. R. Evid. 410.
This interpretation would render withdrawn guilty pleas and related statements inadmissible in
any proceeding against the defendant, even for purposes of impeachment, unless the case falls
within the exception to rule 11(e)(6). See 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 5 410,
at 410-3 to -7,

410[01], at 410-19 (1977).

86. Congress carefully limited the applicability of the protective provision to cases in which a
guilty plea is "later withdrawn." Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(e)(6); Fed. R. Evid. 410. An exception to
this limitation on the admissibilty of related statements is provided in the case of a perjury or
false statement prosecution when the rule 11 examination was recorded, the defendant sworn,
and defense counsel present, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6); Fed. R. Eid. 410.
87. Such advice, apparently, was not even considered. The discrepancy indicates that rule
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inconsistency may improperly lead a pleader, who is warned in strict accordance with the unambiguous terms of rule 11(c)(5), reasonably to assume that
he could not be prosecuted for making a false statement unless he is placed
under oath during the proceeding. His assumption would be mistaken,
88
however, unless he later sought successfully to withdraw his plea. Under the
circumstances, a district judge might better advise the defendant generally
that statements made in connection with his plea may later be used against
him, rather than recite rule 11(c)(5) verbatim in his allocution. 89 This would
prevent any misapprehension on the part of the defendant that he is somehow
immunized when, in fact, he is not.
In consideration of the numerous problems posed by rule 11(c)(5), it is
suggested that the provision be repealed. The provision is not only misleading, but it is also unnecessary. There is no reason to warn a defendant who
has been ceremonially sworn to tell the truth that he may be punished if he
should lie. 90 That, however, is the only advice imparted by the rule.
11(c)(5), as written, may not truly reflect the legislative intent. There are two plausible explanations for this inconsistency. The first possibility is that Congress was solely concerned with the use
of a defendant's rule 11 statements at the trial on the very charge to which a guilty plea is entered
and subsequently withdrawn, and meant to restrict the admissibility of those statements only at
that particular trial. Such a construction would render rule 11(e)(6) a mere codification of case
law. Cf. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927) (statement related to withdrawn guilty
plea held inadmissible in ensuing trial on the charge to which the plea had been entered); United
States v. Albano, 414 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (same). This intent, however, is not
articulated in the statute, which provides that the protected statements are "not admissible in any
civil or criminal proceeding." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6) (emphasis supplied).
An alternative theory is that the drafters would have included the additional advice, had they
thought of it. The argument would be that since the legislators believed that, in fairness, pleaders
should be apprised of the possibility of a perjury sanction, .ee text accompanying note 48 supra,
they would also desire that the defendants be warned of similar ramifications that a guilty plea
might carry. Such an interpretation, however, would unduly expand the plain meaning of the
rule, and would violate the basic tenets of statutory construction. "[Clourts will liberally construe
the rules [of criminal procedure] to achieve their purposes, will not judicially legislate, will
consider extrinsic materials in case of ambiguity, and interpret the rules in the light of the history
of their adoption." 3 C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Const ruction § 67. 10, at 237 (4th ed. 1974)
(footnotes omitted). Warning a pleader of the potential evidentiary uses of his statements is not
constitutionally required, cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (Constitution requires
advice of rights to trial by jury, of confrontation, and against self-incrimination), nor has it been
considered a statutory requirement under previous versions of rule 11, cf. Wall v. United States,
500 F.2d 38, 39 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1025 (1974) (defendant need not
be advised of every collateral consequence of his guilty plea). The view that the court need not
advise a defendant of the collateral consequences of his plea persists under the amended version
of rule 11. See United States v. Bambulas, 571 F.2d 525, 527 (10th Cir. 1978)(per curiam);
Sanchez v. United States, No. 77-2247, slip op. at 3398 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1977)(per curiam). If
Congress had sought to change existing law to such an extent, it would have clearly done so.
88. See note 137 infra and accompanying text.
89. If the defendant should question this advice, the examining judge may then explain the
potential sanctions more thoroughly.
90. It is common knowledge that a witness at a trial is not specifically advised, at the time the
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The remedy for the presiding judge's failure to comply strictly with rule 11
in his examination of the defendant is to grant the defendant permission to
withdraw his guilty plea and plead anew. 91 However, the vacation of a guilty
plea does not appear to be appropriate where a judge neglects to advise a
defendant that his rule 11 statements may later be used against him in a
perjury prosecution. That is distinctly a collateral consequence of the plea,
and is purely an evidentiary consideration. 9 2 The proper remedial action, if
any is required, should be exclusion of the relevant statements at a subsequent
93
perjury trial, rather than vitiation of the defendant's guilty plea.
Provision (5) is an unnecessary detraction from rule 11(c) as a whole. It has
compelled an appellate court, in the interest of justice, to carve out an
exception to an otherwise mandatory rule. 94 If not repealed in its entirety, the
warning should at least be separated from the rest of rule 11(c), with a proviso
that this advice need be given only when the perjury sanction would be
available under rule 11(e)(6). 95
In district courts that do not now administer the oath during the rule 11
proceedings, the meaningless warning may well inhibit a defendant from
entering an otherwise well-considered and advantageous guilty plea.9 6 On the
other hand, it may delude a defendant into believing that his statements may
never be used against him. Moreover, district judges who do not customarily
place the pleader under oath may be induced to do so in order to facilitate
compliance with the letter of the rule. 97 These considerations negate the
usefulness and desirability of rule 11(c)(5).
oath is administered to him, that he may be prosecuted for perjury if he testifies falsely. He is
presumed to know this. There does not appear to be any reason for a defendant who is placed
under oath at a plea proceeding to receive the benefit of such advice. The mere fact that the oath
is administered should be warning enough.
91. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 471-72 (1969); Canady v. United States, 5S4
F.2d 203, 205 (5th Cir. 1977).
92. See 121 Cong. Rec. 23322 (1975).

93. If no perjury or false statement prosecution ensues, failure to advise the defendant of that
eventuality should be considered harmless error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (harmless error rule).
94. See text accompanying notes 60-75 supra.
95. See note 7 supra.
96. Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 674, 679 (may discourage candor during negotiations and may hinder the reaching of
plea agreements).
97. Some recent cases indicate that this is, in fact, happening. Consider, for example, the
following language: "The Court then proceeded to examine each of these defendants, under oath,
as contemplated by Rule 11." United States v. Slawik, 427 F. Supp. 824, 828 (D. Del. 1977)
(emphasis supplied). "The proceedings began with an examination under oath, including explanations to [the defendant], all as called for by F.R.Crim.P. 11(c) and (d)." United States v. Sarubbi,
416 F. Supp. 633, 634 (D.N.J. 1976)(emphasis supplied).
Although Congress has indicated that rules 11(c)(5) and I1(e)(6) should not be considered an
order to place the defendant under oath at the plea hearing, see note 50 supra, the Advisory
Committee and some commentators have recommended such a procedure as desirable, see
Proposed Amendments, supra note 2, at 286 (Advisory Committee Note); Bishop, supra note 18,
at 536.
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ll(e)(6)

98

Rule 1l(e)(6) contemplates that a federal defendant who enters a guilty
plea under oath may subsequently be subjected to a prosecution for perjury or
false statement. The development of a satisfactory version of this provision
engendered considerable congressional controversy. A comparison of the various proposals for the provision has been summarized as follows:
The Senate amendment would strike this provision altogether and leave it to the Rules
of Evidence, which would permit on the record statements to be used for impeachment
and in a prosecution for perjury or false statement. The Supreme Court proposal
would not permit any use and the House bill would permit use of such statements in a
perjury or false statement prosecution, provided it was made under oath on the record
and in the presence of counsel. 99
The version ultimately adopted by Congress is a modification of the House
proposal, and provides that statements made in connection with a withdrawn
guilty plea, but not the plea itself, may be admissible in a subsequent
prosecution for perjury or false statement.100
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court recommended no such exception to
the protection otherwise afforded a defendant under rule 1l(e)(6),101 and some
legislators have charged that its inclusion is "unfair" and will "undermine-not facilitate--plea bargaining. 102 While Congress realized that the perjury
sanction might discourage candor and tend to thwart the plea bargaining
process, it believed that these considerations were outweighed by the need to
"protect the integrity of the judicial process from willful deceit and untruthfulness. 10° 3 The legislative history offers no further explanation for including
the perjury exception to rule 1l(e)(6). It would appear, however, that Congress added the provision as a matter of established policy, 0 4 without due
consideration for the distinctions between statements elicited at a plea pro98. See note 7 supra.
99. 121 Cong. Rec. 23320 (1975); cf. Fed. R. Evid. 410, 28 U.S.C. app. at 1968 (Supp. IV
1974) (amended 1975) (on which the supporters of the Senate amendment preferred to rely).
100. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 713, 714. The Conference was of the opinion that "neither a plea nor the offer
of a plea ought to be admissible for any purpose," and therefore modified the original House bill.
Id.
101. The Supreme Court proposed that rule 11(e)(6) provide: "Inadmissibility of plea discussions. Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to
plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made In
connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal
proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer." Proposed Amendments, supra note 2,
at 276-77. See also ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 2.2 (Approved Draft 1968).
102. H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 674, 709 (separate views of Representatives Holtzman and Drinan).
103. Id. at 7, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 674, 679.
104. Other statutes which provide for some type of immunity from prosecution contain
similar perjury exceptions. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6) with 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976) and
Fed. R. Evid. 410.
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ceeding and other testimony. S The governing theory seems to be that where
sworn statements are given, a perjury sanction should be available.
Inclusion of the perjury exception in rule 11(e)(6) indicates Congress' recognition of the fact that some district courts do place the defendant under oath
during the course of the plea proceeding. 1 0 6 Therefore, in order to determine
the value and validity of the statutory provision, it is necessary to examine the
reasons underlying the employment of that practice by those courts.
As has been stated previously, the oath is not required under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.' 0 7 Consequently, the practices with respect to
the custom vary within the federal court system. For example, in the Second
Circuit, as a general rule, the defendant need not be placed under oath. 08
Other circuits apparently utilize the practice but do not necessarily require
it.10 9 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, insists
that the
entire rule 11 proceeding be conducted while the defendant is under
0
oath.
The practice of placing a defendant under oath when he enters a guilty plea
appears to be a recent development."' It has ostensibly been employed to
ensure truthfulness at the plea proceeding" 2 and to "preclude collateral
attacks" on guilty pleas by a defendant's later assertions that his statements
105.

See notes 192-96 infra and accompanying text.
106. Congressional awareness of the practice may further be inferred from the statement by
the Judiciary Committee that it does not necessarily encourage the swearing-in of the defendant.
See note 50 supra.
107. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
108. United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 637 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976).
109. This is evident from many cases which indicate that the defendants were placed under
oath at the plea proceedings, apparently, as a matter of course. See, e.g., United States v.
Adams, 555 F.2d 353, 354 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1131 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 70 (1977); Forrens v. United States, 504 F.2d 65, 67 (9th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Boyd, 429 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (D. Md. 1977); United States v. Garafola, 428 F.
Supp. 620, 622 (D.N.J. 1977).
110. See Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
See also Reports of the Conference for District Court Judges, 64 F.R.D. 225, 250 (1974). The
swearing-in of the pleader is considered a requisite procedure by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and by the district courts within its jurisdiction. Vandenades v. United States, 523
F.2d 1220, 1224 (5th Cir. 1975); Dugan v. United States, 521 F.2d 231, 233 n.1 (5th Cir. 197s);
United States v. Aleman, 417 F. Supp. 117, 120 (S.D. Tex. 1976). In a recent decision, the Fifth
Circuit reiterated its stand on this issue as follows: "This court's construction of Rule 11 requires
that the defendant be under oath for the entirety of the proceedings." United States v. Aldridge,
553 F.2d 922, 922 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
111. Research discloses no case prior to 1971 which indicates that a federal defendant was
placed under oath at the time of his pleading guilty. An earlier case makes the following
observation: "[T]he plea is not evidence. Nor is it testimonial. It is not under oath. Nor is it
subject to cross-examination." Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(emphasis supplied).
112. United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 174 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 214
(1977).
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during the proceeding were false. 13 In Bryan v. United States1 14 the Fifth
Circuit adopted the practice expressly for the purposes of limiting such attacks
and ensuring that plea bargains are honored.
In Bryan the defendant pleaded guilty to an escape charge, and his plea
was accepted by the district judge." 5 At the rule 11 proceeding, both the
defendant and his counsel asserted that no promises had been made to induce
the defendant to enter the guilty plea. Later, in a section 2255 petition for
post-conviction relief, 116 the defendant alleged that a plea bargain had, in
fact, been made, and that the record of the plea proceeding was a sham
concocted by the defense, the prosecution, and the district judge. He frankly
admitted that he had deliberately lied during the rule 11 inquiry for the
purpose of developing a ritualistic record in accordance with the plea agreement. 117
The court upheld Bryan's guilty plea despite the defendant's postconviction allegations. 118 In its prospective opinion, however, it set out "minimum practices" for accepting guilty pleas, which included placing the pleader
under oath. 11 9 This practice has been subsequently upheld by that court as a
requisite element of the rule 11 proceeding. 12 0 However, its value in achieving
113. United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975).
Specifically, the object of the oath is "to eliminate the possibility that a defendant will believe that
part of the process of implementing a plea bargain is to deny that such a bargain exists." United
States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 174 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 214 (1977). The practice
was further designed to make the perjury sanction available in such cases. Reports of the
Conference for District Court Judges, 64 F.R.D. 225, 250 (1974).
114. 492 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
115. Id. at 777. The defendant apparently was not placed under oath at that time.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). For a discussion of this method of challenging a previously
entered plea of guilty, see notes 146-47 infra and accompanying text.
117. 492 F.2d at 777.
118. The defendant's petition was denied on policy grounds. The court reasoned that a
defendant who, at a plea proceeding, affirms that no plea bargain has been negotiated should not
be permitted to rest on the falsity of his statements to successfully challenge his plea. The guilty
plea was upheld because, in the opinion of the court, to grant the petition would open the door to
innumerable similar requests. Id. at 780.
119. Id. at 781. The practices set out by the court as minimum requirements in accepting
guilty pleas are as follows: "The court shall state that plea agreements are permissible and that
the defendant and all counsel have a duty to disclose the existence and details of any agreement
which relates to the plea tendered. Specific inquiry shall be made as to the existence of such an
agreement before a plea is accepted. The defendant shall be placed under oath." Id.
120. See Goodwin v. United States, 544 F.2d 826, 827 (5th Cir. 1977)(per curiam); Dugan v.
United States, 521 F.2d 231, 233 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975); Rosado v. United States, 510 F.2d 1098,
1100 (5th Cir. 1975)(per curiam). Although most of the other requirements set forth in Bryan, see
note 119 supra, have been incorporated into rule 11, as amended, the swearing-in of the
defendant persists as an additional requirement in the Fifth Circuit, see United States v.
Aldridge, 553 F.2d 922, 922 (5th Cir. 1977)(per curiam). However, it is apparent that the Fifth
Circuit does not maintain that the oath is absolutely indispensable to a valid guilty plea. Unsworn
pleas have been upheld within that jurisdiction where no prejudice resulted from failure to
administer the oath. See United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 214 (1977); United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 91-92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1032 (1975). See also La Bar v. United States, 522 F.2d 202, 204 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
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the purposes for which it was adopted 21 is questionable.
The primary concern of the Bryan court was that a defendant might
conceal a plea bargain because of the traditional attitude that such agreements
should be "kept in the shadows." 122 Viewed in light of the amendments to
rule 11, however, this argument for placing the defendant under oath during
the plea proceeding loses all cogency, since a principal purpose of the amendments was to encourage plea agreements. 23 Rule 11 now specifcally authorizes plea bargaining,1 24 and requires that the entire plea agreement be
disclosed in open court. 125 The very danger sought to be avoided by placing
the pleader under oath has, therefore, been remedied by Congress. If a
defendant should lie at a new rule 11 inquiry with respect to a plea agreement, and then challenge his plea on that basis, a reviewing court would be
justified in relying on the record of the proceeding to determine the validity of
his claim. The attorneys for the defense and the Government have an affirmative obligation to correct a defendant's misrepresentations on this issue immediately, if their understanding of the terms of the agreement differs from that
of the defendant. Should the defendant's statements be permitted to stand
without objection, they will, in fact, constitute the terms of the agreement to
which the parties will be bound.1 26 The defendant, after having been questioned fully as to the existence and nature of any plea bargain, should not
later be heard to complain as a result of his own willful failure to reveal the
truth. 127

In some cases, of course, the rule 11 record will not dispose of certain
claims which may be raised by a defendant in a post-conviction attack on his
guilty plea 28 and it may be necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing on the
issue. This is particularly true where the defendant alleges, with good cause,
121.

See text accompanying notes 113-14 supra.

122. 492 F.2d at 780. The court stated that "while no problem can arise from the fact of
bargaining, the failure to insist that the court be told whether pleas presented for acceptance have
any part of their basis in an agreement, and, if so, the details of that understanding, may imperil
our system of justice." Id. at 781.
123. H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 37, reprinted in [19751 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 674, 708 (separate views of Representatives Holtzman and Drinan).
124. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1).
125. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2). Because of this provision, any untruthfulness concerning a
plea bargain should be attributable to prosecution and defense counsel, as well as to the
defendant himself. It should be noted that, if good cause is shown, the plea proceeding may be
conducted in camera. Id.
126. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3).
127. Some recent cases indicate that the transcript of the proceeding is regarded as conclusive
whether or not the defendant was sworn, and even where the validity of the plea is challenged on
the basis of its voluntariness, absent some cogent reason justifying the belief that the record is
untruthful. See United States v. Bambulas, 571 F.2d 525, 526 (10th Cir. 1978)1per curiam);
United States v. Cowin, 565 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Indeed, it was on this very
basis that Bryan's conviction was affirmed. Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d at 779-80.
Generally, a defendant may not repudiate express rule 11 statements, unless the issue of their
voluntariness is raised. See Comment, Plea Bargaining Mishaps-The Possibility of Collaterally
Attacking the Resultant Plea of Guilty, 65 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 170, 174 (1974).
128.

See generally Collateral Attack, supra note 5.
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that his plea was involuntary. 1 29 Placing the defendant under oath at the plea

proceeding, however, should not be employed as a means of alleviating the

need for such hearings.' 30 When a defendant routinely affirms, at a rule 11
inquiry, that his guilty plea was not the result of any threats or promises, the
fact that he was under oath at the time should not be used categorically to
deter him from later presenting a meritorious claim that his previous assertion
3
was not true.1 '
Although it has been recognized that placing the pleader under oath will
not necessarily diminish the number of collateral attacks on guilty pleas or
obviate the need for evidentiary hearings in such cases,' 32 proponents of the
practice maintain that the perjury sanction should be available against a
defendant who challenges his plea on the ground that his rule 11 statements
were untrue.' 33 As a practical matter, however, it is unlikely that a defendant
would ever actually be prosecuted on such a perjury charge. Where the
defendant's attack on his guilty plea is not successful, 134 the Government is
generally satisfied to rest on the plea and sentence with respect to the substantive offense. An additional prosecution for perjury would be needless and time
consuming, and would involve difficulties of proof.3" Moreover, since rule
129.

See generally 29 Vand. L. Rev. 1449 (1976).

130. Even the Fifth Circuit has indicated that it would vacate a guilty plea if statements
made during the rule 11 proceeding were shown to be truly coerced. See Bryan v. United States,
492 F.2d at 779. The court presumably would reach such a result even where the coerced
statements were made under oath. See 121 Cong. Rec. 17192 (1975).
131. See CollateralAttack, supra note 5, at 1404 n.41. To predicate a defendant's conviction
upon his own involuntary statements would violate his constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. "While the [Government's] concern with the finality of its convictions is
not to be underestimated, the [Government]--not to mention the defendant-has a superior
interest in assuring the accuracy of its truth-finding process and protecting the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants." Guilty Plea as Waiver, supra note 14, at 1444 (footnote omitted).
There is language to the effect that the oath may, in fact,.seriously limit a defendant's chances of
success in challen'ing the plea on the basis of voluntariness. In upholding the validity of a guilty
plea that was attacked on the ground that it was coerced, one court has stated that to permit the
defendant "to alisregard his denial of any threats, made under a solemn oath in open court,
without any prompting or urging by anyone, 'would seriously undermine respect for the oath, and
ultimately for the judicial process itself.' " Edmonds v. Lewi3, 546 F.2d 566, 568 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977) (quoting Martinez v. United States, 411 F. Supp. 1352, 1359-60
(D.N.J. 1976), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1977)).
62. United States v. Hawthorne, 502 F.2d 1183, 1188 (d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
894 (1976).
133. ld; see Reports of the Conferencefor District Court Judges, 64 F.R.D. 225, 250 (1974). It
should be noted that the threat of a perjury sanction is an uncertain means of inspiring
truthfulness from a defendant. See Silving, The Oath: I, 68 Yale L.J. 1329, 1389 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Silving I]; Collateral Attack, supra note 5, at 1404 n.41. Similarly, the
sanction is probably an ineffective deterrent for a defendant, who already faces a jail sentence for
the crime to which he has pleaded, from attempting to contest his conviction. Id.
134. Comparatively few pleas of guilty are later permitted to be withdrawn. See Comment,
Plea BargainingMishaps-The Possibility of CollaterallyAttacking the Resultant Plea of Guilty,
65 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 170, 172 & n.18 (1974).
135. See Comment, Perjury: The Forgotten Offense, 65 3. Crim. L. & Criminology 361, 367
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11(e)(6) applies only when a guilty plea has been vitiated,
a defendant
whose plea is upheld could be prosecuted for making false statements whether
or not his declarations were made under oath, 137 if such further punishment is
deemed necessary. Therefore, the oath serves no useful purpose when the plea
of guilty is finally dispositive of the original case.
When the defendant is permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty, different
considerations come into play. 138 The federal rules provide a number of
methods by which a guilty plea may be withdrawn. Under rule 32(d) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may move to withdraw his
plea either before or after sentencing. 139 Such withdrawal is considered a
privilege rather than a right, and the decision to permit it rests within the
discretion of the trial court.1 4 0 Presentence withdrawal is governed by a "fair
and just" standard which was established by the Supreme Court in Kercheval
v. United States. 141 The federal courts have interpreted this standard strictly,
particularly in recent years. 14 2 As procedures for accepting guilty pleas have
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Perjury]. It has been noted that the initiation of such a perjury
prosecution would be rare indeed. United States v. Boone, 543 F.2d 1090, 1092 n.2 (4th Cir.
1976).

136. See note 7 supra.
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (crime of false statement). This section has been held
applicable to statements made to the judicial, as well as to the legislative and executive, branch of
the government. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955); see, e.g., United States v.
Stephens, 315 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (W.D. Okla. 1970) (statute covers false statements made
before a United States district court). It should also be noted that the penalties for false statement
are comparable to those for perjury. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621,
1623 (1976).
138. Although rule 11(e)(6) prohibits the introduction of a withdrawn plea of guilty or related
statements generally in criminal proceedings, it preserves the perjury sanction in such cases,
provided the rule 11 inquiry was conducted while the defendant was under oath, and the
statement was made on the record and in the presence of counsel. Fed. R. Crim. P. 1l(e)(6).
139. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d).
140. Note, Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in the FederalCourts Prior to Sentencing, 27 Baylor
L. Rev. 793, 793 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Presentence Withdrawal].
141. 274 U.S. 220 (1927). The applicable standard was announced as follows: "The court in
exercise of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea of not guilty and have a trial
if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Id. at 224.
142. See generally Presentence Withdrawal, supra note 140. Interpretation of the "fair and
just" standard has undergone many changes since it was first announced by the Supreme Court.
Initially, it was thought that the guilty plea should stand unless the defendant had been denied
some fundamental right- See United States v. Swaggerty, 218 F.2d 875, 880 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 959 (1955). Later, some circuits adopted a more lenient approach in holding that

presentence plea withdrawals should be "freely allowed." Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396,
400 (D.C. Cir. 1957). As plea proceedings became more closely regulated, however, the courts
began to shift from a "freely allowed" standard to a stricter approach by which '[olnce it [was]
established that Rule 11 ha[d] been fully complied with the occasion for setting aside a guilty plea
should seldom arise." United States v. Rawlins, 440 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1971). This rigid
approach was ratified by the Supreme Court when it refused to vacate a guilty plea although the
defendant alleged innocence of the crime and stated specific reasons for desiring to withdraw his
plea. See Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972). Today, the federal courts of appeals will rarely
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become more rigid, the criteria for withdrawal have become stricter. 143 Postsentence withdrawal is permitted only "to correct manifest injustice."'1 44 Apparently for policy reasons, a heavier burden is placed upon a defendant who
seeks to withdraw his plea after sentence has been imposed. 145 A sentenced
federal defendant may seek to have his plea vacated by means of a section
2255 action, 14 6 which is similar to a habeas corpus proceeding brought by a
state prisoner. Such relief is difficult to obtain, however, and is generally
granted only in exceptional circumstances, where prejudice inures from "a
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice. 1 47 Finally, a district court must permit a defendant to withdraw his
guilty plea if the court rejects a plea agreement between the defense and the
prosecution. 148 This is the only149
situation in which a defendant may withdraw
his plea as a matter of right.
The foregoing provisions place an onerous burden on a defendant who
seeks to withdraw his plea. In most instances, he must show that it would be
unjust and prejudicial to allow the guilty plea to stand. If the plea proceeding
is conducted in compliance with rule 11, the only valid bases upon which a
defendant may successfully contest his plea are those of coercion or of the
court's refusal to accept a negotiated plea agreement. To impose a perjury
sanction on a defendant whose plea is vacated on such grounds, however,
would clearly be unjust.
Logically, it is incongruous that statements made at a plea proceeding that
was initially unfair can, nevertheless, be used to convict a defendant for
perjury. A literal reading of rule l1(e)(6),1 50 however, would authorize such a
prosecution against a defendant who states under oath that his plea of guilty
is voluntary, if it later appears that the plea was in fact coerced. This problem
overturn a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, provided rule I
procedures have been followed. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 497 F.2d 177 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974); United States v. Cook, 487 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. McCoy, 477 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
143. The present status of presentence guilty plea withdrawals has been characterized as
follows: "The courts seem to indicate that since they are bending over backwards to make sure
that a defendant is aware of what he is doing when he enters a guilty plea, they will not allow
that defendant to make a mockery of the system by allowing him to withdraw his plea simply
because he changes his mind and now wants a jury trial." Presentence Withdrawal, supra note
140, at 799.
144. Fed. R. Crim.P. 32(d).
145. See United States v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999, 1008-09 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Paradiso v. United
States, 482 F.2d 409, 416 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 560-61 (3d Cir.
1969); Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1963); High v. United States, 288
F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 923 (1961).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
147. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); accord, Davis v. United States, 417 U.S.
333, 346 (1974).
148. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4).
149. Presentence Withdrawal, supra note 140, at 799.
150. See note 7 supra.
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was discussed in the House of Representatives,I ' where it was agreed that
statements made in connection with coerced guilty pleas should not be admitted into evidence under the exception to rule 1l(e)(6), on the ground that such
statements would be tainted and a perjury prosecution would not lie.' sz
Although no change was made in the proposed bill to reflect this clarification, 153 it is clear that the legislature intended that statements related to a
coerced plea of guilty should not be used against the defendant in a subsequent perjury prosecution.
In the event that a plea bargain negotiated by the prosecution and the
defense is rejected, the district court must afford the defendant an opportunity
to withdraw his plea. 15 4 If the defendant takes advantage of this opportunity,
however, the Government may then be able to "go after the defendant for
perjury." 55 Although a defendant has an automatic right to withdraw his
guilty plea in such a case, his ability to exercise that right may be effectively
thwarted by the threat of a perjury sanction.I s 6 Such intimidation would
appear to violate the insistence by the Supreme Court that a defendant's
151. See H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in [19751 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 674, 709 (separate views of Representatives Holtzman and Drinan); 121 Cong. Rec.
17491-92 (1975).
152. 121 Cong. Rec. 17492 (1975).

153. During the House discussions regarding coerced guilty pleas, Congressman Drinan
suggested that clarification of the issue be incorporated into the report on the bill. Id. This
apparently was not done. See generally H.IL Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
[1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 674.
154. See notes 148-49 supra and accompanying text.
155. H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in [19751 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 674, 709 (separate views of Representatives Holtzman and Drinan). It was thought by
some House members that this result was unfair and would act to undermine plea bargaining,
thereby defeating a principal purpose of the amendments. Id., reprinted in 11975 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 674, 709. Nevertheless, the majority considered it comparatively more
important to "protect the integrity of the judicial process" by retaining the perjury sanction. Id. at
7, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 674, 679; 121 Cong. Rec. 17491-92 (1975)
(remarks of Representative Hungate).
156. One advocate of taking guilty pleas under oath maintains that the practice should not be
a bar to withdrawing a plea, at least prior to sentencing, where the defendant knows the possible
double consequences of such an action. Bishop, supra note 18, at 538. It must be admitted,
however, that although the oath need not constitute a procedural bar to plea withdrawal, the
perjury sanction may undoubtedly inhibit a defendant from moving to withdraw an otherwise
voidable plea. Bishop agrees that a "potential perjury prosecution might well stave off plea
withdrawal," and that if an appellant from a conviction upon a plea of guilty "faces possible
consecutive sentences for perjury, it might well deter him from the effort unless his appeal has
genuine merit." Id. at 537-38. But see Collateral Attack, supra note S, at 1404 n.41. Bishop
concedes, however, that valid reasons to appeal do exist, and that to preclude the defendant's
right to appeal would pose constitutional problems. Bishop, supra note 18, at 538. See also note
157 infra and accompanying text. Measures to limit the number of appeals from guilty pleas
should not be taken at the expense of justice. "The state's interest in assuring the accuracy of
criminal convictions so that defendants are not unjustly deprived of their liberty should be given
greater effect than its concomitant concern with preserving the finality of convictions." Guilty
Plea as Waiver, supra note 14, at 1444.
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procedural rights should not be curtailed. For example, it has been held that a
defendant's right to appeal may not be restrained by the threat of receiving a
stiffer sentence, should he exercise that right.1 5 7 Similarly, a defendant should
not be dissuaded from exercising his statutory right to withdraw his guilty
plea through fear of a subsequent perjury prosecution.
It is likely that a defendant who withdraws his plea may be effectively
precluded from asserting his innocence at trial, because of the availability of
the perjury sanction. If he should contradict statements made at the plea
proceeding, while testifying in his own behalf at trial, he would afford the
Government the basis for another prosecution against him. Moreover, the
sanction serves as a punitive mechanism because it would most probably be
who, after withdrawing his plea, is acquitted of
imposed upon a defendant
15 8
the charges at trial.
In view of the limited situations in which the perjury sanction would be
available and the even fewer cases in which it would actually be imposed, it is
most apt to affect the defendant who has the "misfortune" to be represented
by counsel, has a valid and just reason for withdrawing his plea, and is
acquitted at the trial on the substantive charge. Instead of preserving the
integrity of the courts, it would seem that the oath and its concomitant
perjury sanction, in such a situation, serve merely as additional means by
which the prosecution can pursue a defendant whom it could not otherwise
convict. Therefore, although one should not be granted a "license to lie"'I 9 in
court, no practical reason exists for placing a defendant under oath at the time
he enters a guilty plea.
V. THE NATURE OF THE PLEA PROCEEDING
The rule 11 proceeding is inquisitorial in nature. The court's allocution is
designed to ascertain the defendant's understanding of his rights and the
nature of the charges against him,1 60 the voluntariness of the plea, 161 the
accuracy of the plea, 162 and the existence and nature of any agreement.1 63 The subjectiveness of these issues necessitates that they be
determined primarily through a personal inquiry of the defendant-an inquiry
considerably more extensive than the colloquial "How do you plead?" The
examination typically involves questions concerning the defendant's background, education, use of and treatment for alchohol or drugs, and history of
any mental illness. In addition, the court must often inquire as to the details
of the criminal activity involved in order to satisfy itself that the defendant
admits his guilt as to each and every element of the crime charged.' 64 The
157. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-25 (1969); Gilbreath, The Constitutionality of Harsher Sentences on Retrial in Virginia, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1337, 1342-46 (1976).
158. See Perjury, supra note 133, at 369.
159. 121 Cong. Rec. 23322 (1975) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
160. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1).
161. See id. 11(d).
162. See id. 11(f).
163. See id. 11(e)(2).
164. The requirement that a factual basis for the plea exist was designed to "protect a
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examining judge has wide latitude in his questioning, 16s and his examination
is apt to encompass more than the bare statutory essentials of a valid guilty
plea. The court may request information which the defendant, for various

reasons, may be reluctant to divulge. For instance, the inquiry may call for
answers which would inculpate the defendant in other crimes. In addition, it
may entail technically nonincriminatory matters that the defendant may nevertheless find difficult to discuss. Serious legal and ethical considerations arise
when the defendant is placed under oath in such a situation.
The defendant's rights at the rule 11 proceeding have not been clearly
defined. When faced with incriminatory questions, however, he should clearly
be permitted to invoke his fifth amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. 166 The fact that the defendant, by pleading guilty, waives
his right to a trial on the crime charged and his right to remain silent at that
trial 167 does not imply that he simultaneously agrees to answer inquiries that
may elicit admissions or information relating to other crimes that he may have
committed, but with which he has not been charged. 16 8 The defendant should
defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of
the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge."
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, Notes of
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules to the 1966 Amendments to Rule 11); Rizzo v. United
States, 516 F.2d 789, 794 (2d Cir. 1975) (same). It should be noted, however, that "[aln
acknowledgment of the truth of all the facts essential to guilt rs not] necessary to satisfy the
factual-basis requirement." United States v. Davis, 516 F.2d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 1975). In fact, a
defendant may enter a valid guilty plea over protestations of innocence, if the prosecution's
evidence shows that the likelihood of his conviction, should he proceed to trial, is strong. See
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970); United States v. Davis, 516 F.2d at 578.
165. There are no statutory restrictions on the judge's inquiry, and many of the findings
which must be made by the court are expressly governed by a discretionary or subjective
standard. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
166. See Collateral Attack, supra note 5, at 1408 n.51. The fifth amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. For a survey of the development of the privilege against
self-incrimination, see L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment (1968).
167. As has been stated previously, a plea of guilty necessarily entails a waiver of the
pleader's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. See note 18 supra and accompanying
text. The extent of this waiver, however, is unclear. The drafters of the amendments to rule I I
believed that the waiver was best explained in terms of the defendant's right to plead not guilty
and his right to a trial at which he may not be compelled to testify against himself. See Proposed
Amendments, supra note 2, at 279-80. Rule 11, therefore, merely states that, in pleading guilty,
the defendant waives his right to a trial and his concomitant right to remain silent at that trial.
See Fed. R_ Crim. P. 11(c)(3)-(4). It does not address the issue of whether the defendant may
assert his privilege against self-incrimination at the plea proceeding itself.
168. It may be argued that a defendant, by entering a plea of guilty, waives his privilege
against self-incrimination entirely, on the ground that he exposes himself to a high level of
incrimination by pleading guilty, and, therefore, should be prepared to answer any and all
questions concerning the crime he committed, without the benefit of the fifth amendment
privilege. See generally Comment, Waiver of the Fifth: What Level of Incrimination?, 26 Sw.
L.J. 589 (1972). Under this view, if the defendant wishes to preserve his right to remain silent, he
may do so by pleading not guilty and proceeding to trial on the charge. This contention, however,
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be able to enter an informed plea of guilty to the particular offense charged
without being compelled to give evidence which may be used to convict him
of a separate past crime. 169 The availability of the privilege, however, is of
is unpersuasive and the result would be unfair. A guilty plea should constitute only a limited
waiver of the defendant's fifth amendment privilege, that is, a waiver to the extent that the
defendant admits his guilt of the specific offense to which he is pleading, but retention of the
privilege to the extent that his rule 11 responses may implicate him in other crimes. Since rule 11
contains no provision for advising the defendant either that he has the right to remain silent after
offering to plead guilty, or that by his offer he waives any such right and must answer any
questions posed by the court, a more encompassing waiver should not be implied. It has been
stated that "[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege" and that " 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of
fundamental constitutional rights." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (quoting Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). But see generally Keefe, Confessions, Admissions
and the Recent Curtailment of the Fifth Amendment Protection, 51 Conn. B.J. 266 (1977).
Moreover, it may not be in the defendant's interest to proceed to trial. Placing a defendant who
wishes to plead guilty in a situation in which he is effectively forced to exercise his right to a trial
frustrates one purpose of rule 11, which is "to facilitate the plea bargaining process and thus
allow criminal cases to be concluded without going to trial." H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 37, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 674, 708. It is incongruous that a
defendant who is willing to admit his guilt to a specific charge and to accept punishment for It
may, nevertheless, be compelled to go through an expensive, time-consuming, and possibly futile
trial in order to retain his fifth amendment rights. To place a defendant in such an untenable
position, while simultaneously defeating the purposes of a viable legislative enactment, is clearly
unjust.
169. "[Tlhe privilege against self-incrimination precludes the use of compelled testimony to
prove a prior crime." Note, Statutory Immunity and the Perjury Exception, 10 Cal. W.L. Rev.
428, 441 (1974). It has been held that the privilege is available in many types of proceedings, and
is not limited to courtroom trials. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile delinquency
proceeding); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police custodial interrogations); Wood v.
United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942)(preliminary hearing in Police Court). Similarly, the
privilege should be available at the plea proceeding with respect to crimes other than that to
which the plea is entered. If a defendant is precluded from asserting the privilege when faced
with incriminatory questions at the plea proceeding, his responses would be unconstitutionally
compelled, unless he is afforded immunity which is coextensive with his privilege against
self-incrimination. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 54, 79 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964). Within the
context of the plea proceeding, however, it is highly improbable that such immunity would be
available.
Generally, a person who is required to make incriminating statements may seek protection
from prosecution based on those statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). Under the federal
immunity statutes, however, the court may not grant immunity sua sponte. That prerogative lies
with the prosecutor. United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 685 n.4 (3d Cir. 1976); see 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6003, 6005 (1976). If immunity from further prosecution is not incorporated into the plea
agreement, it is most unlikely that the Government would consent to immunity with respect to
unrelated admissions elicited by the judge. The plea proceeding is not an investigation, and the
prosecution would gain no benefit from such a gesture. It is also noteworthy that in the federal
courts, immunity may not be automatically invoked by a witness' incriminating response, but
may be granted only after an affirmative assertion of his fifth amendment privilege. See id. §
6002.
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questionable value. The defendant may be hesitant to assert it before the
judge who will ultimately determine his sentence.' 70 Moreover, the privilege
offers no protection for a defendant who is reluctant to give answers which,
provide
although they may be odious and humiliating, will not necessarily
7
evidence that could be used to convict him of another crime.1 '
The defendant's ability to remain silent at the plea proceeding, should he
desire to do so, is severely restricted.1 72 The Supreme Court has made some
affirmative response on the part of the pleader a constitutional requisite to a
valid guilty plea. The Court reversed the conviction of a defendant who had
refused to speak at a plea proceeding and who, instead, had pleaded guilty
The limited protection afforded under Fed. R. Crim. P. 1l(e)(6) is of no aid to most defendants
in guarding against violations of fifth amendment rights, since that provision applies only if the
plea is later withdrawn, and it does not provide for the exclusion of derivative evidence.
Although Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6) and Fed. R. Evid. 410 preclude the use of statements made in
connection with a withdrawn plea in subsequent proceedings, they do not purport to restrict the
admissibility of the fruits of such evidence. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(e)(6) and Fed. R. Evid.
410 with 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). In addition, the precise meaning of "statements made in
connection with, and relevant to" a plea of guilty, Fed. R. Crim. P. 1l(e)(6), has not yet been
definitively interpreted by the courts. Cf. Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 n.3 (1976) (per curiam)
(question of related statements within the meaning of rule 11(e)(6) expressly not decided). It is
possible, therefore, that an admission of another crime during the rule 11 inquiry may be
considered unrelated to the plea negotiation process and, thus, fall without the coverage of rule
11(e)(6). Cf. United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 729-32 (2d Cir. 1978) (detailed and
incriminating grand jury testimony given by defendant pursuant to a plea bargain that was later
frustrated held admissible against defendant in subsequent trial). It is clear that the rule 11(e)(6)
protection is not coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination.
170. This fear may actually be unfounded in law, since a court's requiring a defendant to
make nonimmune incriminating statements in order to avoid a harsh sentence is subject to
constitutional challenge. It has been held that a judge may not condition leniency in sentencing
upon a defendant's waiver of his fifth amendment privilege. See United States v. Garcia, 544
F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1976). To put a defendant to this "Hobson's choice: remain silent and lose the
opportunity to be [an] object[ ]of leniency, or speak and run the risk of additional prosecution,"
erodes the protection afforded by the fifth amendment. Id. at 685.
171. Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition,
61 Minn. L. Rev. 383, 387 (1977).
172. A defendant who prefers not to answer the court's questions may be able to withdraw his
offer to plead guilty and proceed to trial on the charge. Such an action, however, may well be
detrimental to both the defendant and the Government. If the defendant has offered to plead
guilty, it is likely that the Government has sufficient evidence with which to convict him at trial.
The defendant may, therefore, wish to plead guilty for a variety of reasons, including the hope of
obtaining a lighter sentence and avoiding the embarrassment of an extended trial. Overman v.
United States, 304 F. Supp. 237, 240 (W.D. Tenn. 1969); Pleading Guilty, supra note S,at 117.
The prosecution, on the other hand, may be prejudiced by reliance on the fact that the case
would be disposed of by guilty plea. Trials are expensive and time consuming for the Government, and dispositions by guilty plea help to improve the quality of the trials held in other cases.
Brown v. Parratt, 560 F.2d 303, 309 (8th Cir. 1977). "[Plerhaps the greatest benefactor from plea
bargaining is the [Government's] criminal justice system, which cannot tolerate significant numbers of trials." Note, The Waivability by Guilty Plea of Retroactively Endowed Constitutional
Rights, 41 Alb. L. Rev. 115, 123-24 (1977).
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through his attorney. 173 It did so on the ground that the waivers of constitutional rights entailed in a plea of guilty must be intelligent and that the
defendant must indicate his understanding of the waivers involved. 174 In
addition, rule 11 requires that the judge personally address the defendant, 175
and authorizes him to "ask lthe defendant] questions about the offense to
which he has pleaded.' 76 The requirements of the courts and the legislature
in this respect are obviously reasonable, and were adopted in the interest of
the uninformed defendant. Nevertheless, they effectively negate any absolute
claim that the pleader might have to remain silent during the course of the

proceeding.

177

Refusal to answer the court's questions may have significant repercussions
for the defendant. First, he presumably may be held in contempt of court,17 8
although the exercise of the court's contempt power in the context of a rule 11
proceeding seems inappropriate and unfair. The entire federal plea procedure
purports to be free of coercion. The guilty plea itself must be voluntarily
entered. Similarly, statements made by the defendant should be voluntarily
given. That a pleader might be compelled, under threat of contempt, to
respond to questions which he would not otherwise answer, is nothing less
than paradoxical. Imposition of the contempt sanction in such a situation
would appear to be a flagrant abuse of judicial discretion. Secondly, a judge
faced with a recalcitrant pleader may be inclined to impose a harsher sentence
for the crime admitted than he otherwise would. A judge has wide discretion
17 9
in determining which factors he will consider in imposing sentence.
The most likely result of the defendant's silence would be the court's refusal
to accept his guilty plea. It has been observed that the defendant has no
173.

See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).

174.
175.
176.

Id. at 242-44.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)-(d).
Id. 11(c)(5); see id. 11(f).

177. The issue of whether the defendant may have any right to refuse to answer questions
posed by the court was raised during a discussion among district court judges. "One judge raised
a question about required inquiry of a defendant under Rule 11 about the facts of the act to which
a plea of guilty was entered; to wit, might the defendant have the right to remain silent once he
offers a plea of guilty?" Reports of the Conferencefor District Court Judges, 65 F.R.D. 285, 319

(1974). An answer to the question was not reported.
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). The rule 11 inquiry is a judicial proceeding at which tie
contempt sanction may properly be employed. Refusal to answer nonincriminatory matters Is a
basis for contempt, see United States v. Seewald, 450 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972), and a person must answer when directed to do so by the court if the
fifth amendment privilege does not apply, see United States v. Martin, 525 F.2d 703, 708 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1035 (1975); United States v. Flegenheimer, 82 F.2d 751, 751 (2d
Cir. 1936). For the contempt sanction to be imposed for recalcitrance, the question to be
answered must be material, relevant and, not privileged. In re Judson, 14 F. Cas. 4, 4-5
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853) (No. 7,563); Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

Of course, a judge generally would consider his own questions, asked in an effort to establish a
factual basis for a guilty plea, to be both material and relevant.
179.

United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 685 (3d Cir. 1976); 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976).
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absolute right to have his plea of guilty accepted. 180 Acceptance of the plea is
discretionary with the court. 18 1 Since, on the other hand, the defendant need
not provide the court with the information necessary to assure it that the plea
has a basis in fact, 182 it would appear that once the defendant has satisfied the
court that he is pleading voluntarily and that he understands his rights, he no
longer has a duty to speak, provided that the accuracy of the plea can be
otherwise established. In fact, the court's rejection of a guilty plea may, under
certain circumstances, constitute an abuse of judicial discretion. 183 Nevertheless, direct interrogation of the defendant is the preferred procedure for
establishing a factual basis for the plea,' 8 4 and although the defendant has a
"conditional right to have his guilty plea accepted"'8s despite his recalcitrance, he may have to withstand a lengthy trial and appeal before it is finally
determined whether his silence was justified.
Because silence carries the risk of undesirable counteraction by the court,
the pleader may feel compelled to answer any and all questions asked of him
during the rule 11 colloquy. If he is under oath at the time, he must answer
the questions truthfully or expose himself to a perjury prosecution. Since the
questions relate to the respondent's own undesirable activity, the choice is not
an easy one. A defendant who is placed in the position of relating humiliating
events under the penalty of perjury is faced with a serious dilemma in which
180. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962) (dictum); United States v. Daniels, 64
F.R.D. 397, 398-99 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
181. United States v. Hamilton, 492 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Melendrez-Salas, 466 F.2d 861, 862 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United States v. Bednars-ki, 445
F.2d 364, 366 (1st Cir. 1971).
182. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
183. See United States v. Davis, 516 F.2d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1975) (dictum); United States v
Navedo, 516 F.2d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum); United States v. Martinez, 486 F.2d 15, 20-21
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiamr)
Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v Rocco, 397 F.
Supp. 655, 658 (D. Mass. 1975); cf. McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306, 307 tD C Cir 1966) (a
voluntary and informed plea should not be refused without good reason). "When the trial judge is
presented with a 'factual basis for the plea,' . . . an intelligent and voluntary counselled plea
should not be refused simply because the defendant who is willing to enter a plea of guilty is
unable or unwilling to testify to his guilt in factual terms." United States v. Gaskins, 485 F 2d at
1049 (footnote omitted).
184. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
185. United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975).
Because a defendant does have a right, albeit not an absolute one, to plead guilty, rejection of his
plea for his refusal to answer incriminatory questions may not only constitute an abuse of
discretion, but also may be unconstitutional. To force a defendant to choose between two
rights-his right to enter a guilty plea and his right to remain silent-impinges on his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555
F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 685 (3d Cir. 1976). "A
defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to certain rights and protections which derive from
a variety of sources. He is entitled to all of them; he cannot be forced to barter one for another.
When the exercise of one right is made contingent upon the forbearance of another, both rights
are corrupted." United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d at 120.
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rectitude1 86

his
is set against his self-preservation. 187 A defendant has a
natural tendency-augmented, perhaps, by reluctance to cast himself in a
poor light before the judge who will sentence him-to minimize his own
culpability.188 The effect of the oath at the plea proceeding, therefore, is to
encourage perjury rather than to inspire truthfulness.
To administer the oath under circumstances which are conducive to perjury
undermines respect for the ritual and, ultimately, for the judicial process of
which it is a part. This fact has been recognized in civil law jurisdictions,
where efforts have been made to avoid such situations. 89 In those countries,
no oath is administered to an accused in a criminal case.' 90 This prohibition
against the oath of the accused was designed "to protect the declarant...
against the danger of criminal prosecution for perjury [and] against being
required to relate 'events in which he played a more or less odious role.' ,191
Common law jurisdictions, on the other hand, have persisted in administering
an oath to the accused-as for example, when he testifies at trial in his own
defense. 192 In view of the nature of the plea proceeding, the civil law practice
appears to be the better rule in the context of guilty pleas. The pleader is in a
significantly different position from that of the trial witness. Whereas a trial is
adversarial and oral testimony must often be relied upon to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused, the plea is a "procedural mechanism"' 193 and
statements made at the time it is offered are not intended as evidence.' 94 In
effect, the only party to the plea proceeding is the defendant himself. No
compelling social interest is harmed if the pleader minimizes his participation
in the crime. 9-By shading the truth he neither obstructs justice nor impedes
186. Perjury has been considered a crime involving moral turpitude. See PerjuY, supra note
135, at 363 & n.37.

187. Some early theologians "thought that where self-preservation [was] at stake, perjury was
natural, inevitable and hence excusable." Silving I, supza note 133, at 1361.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Navedo, 516 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1975). "A defendant may
attempt to minimize his culpability during his allocution because he knows that the same judge
will be imposing his sentence." Id. at 299 (Kaufman, C.J., dissenting). This tendency on the part
of pleaders is illustrated by the excerpt of a rule I1 colloquy set out in Holland v. United States,
427 F. Supp. 733, 736-37 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Compare id. (defendant's admissions) with id. at
737-38 (Government's evidence).
189. Silving, The Oath: 11, 68 Yale L.J. 1527, 1552 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Silving Ill.
"[Tlhere is a trend toward limiting oath-taking and avoiding its indiscriminate use." Id.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 1529-30, 1533-36.
Id. at 1535-36 (footnote omitted).
Silving I, supra note 133, at 1368; Silving II, supra note 189, at 1568.
193. United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 405
F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969).
194. Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1942). If the statements were
considered testimony per se, the oath would be required. See Fed. R. Evid. 603; cf. United States
v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 4 10 U.S. 984 (1973) (oath required for all
testimonial statements).
195. This observation may be contrasted with the fact that perjurious testimony at a trial may

result in the acquittal of a dangerous criminal or the conviction of an innocent man. See Perjury,
supra note 135, at 363.
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criminal investigation.1 96 To cause a person who is willing to admit his guilt
and accept punishment to deprecate and humiliate himself unnecessarily in
public under the penalty of perjury is an indignity which should not be
tolerated.1 97 "Unless a clear social interest can be shown to exist, the state
should not punish a man for abstract lying." 19 8
In addition to the indignity it inflicts, the oath produces anxiety in the
taker, thereby disturbing the spontaneity of his statements. 199 Such anxiety at
the rule 11 proceeding is especially deleterious. The essence of the guilty plea
is its voluntariness. 20 0 Candor is to be encouraged, since it bears heavily on
this issue. The trepidation instilled by the solemn oath, which may impel a
defendant to furnish information against his will, 20 1 undermines the voluntary

nature of the entire proceeding.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The practice of placing a defendant under oath when he pleads guilty to a
crime in federal court should be abandoned. In view of the Supreme Court's
recent tendency to restrict the scope of fifth amendment protection, 20 2 it is
unlikely that the practice per se could be successfully challenged on the basis of
its constitutionality. Nevertheless, it may present constitutional problems in
individual cases. In addition, the threat of a perjury sanction may discourage
some defendants from entering intelligent and advantageous guilty pleas,
thereby defeating a principal purpose of the amendments to rule 11 by
frustrating the attainment of successful plea agreements. Abandonment of the
practice would also obviate the need for the rule 11(c)(5) warning, and thus,
would alleviate the problems posed by that provision. An analysis of the
reasons propounded in favor of the practice reveals that the procedure is
unnecessary and essentially ineffective in obtaining the objectives sought.
Moreover, the disparagement of human dignity inflicted by the practice
outweighs its value as an abstract means of protecting the integrity of judicial
administration.
The oath has an intimidating effect at the plea proceeding, and therefore
tends to subvert the voluntariness of the defendant's rule 11 allocution. A
196.

The plea proceeding is not an investigative tool. It should not be used to "procure

evidencefor conviction." Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (emphasis in
original).
197. For an argument that the oath per se violates the dignity of man, see Silving U, supra
note 189, at 1574-76.
198. Id. at 1577.
199. Silving I, supra note 133, at 1389.
200. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 1l(d). "Since [the Government] cannot compel the accused to be a
witness against himself, a plea of guilty must be voluntary to be effective as an admission of
guilt." Guilty Plea as Waiver, supra note 14, at 1436 (footnotes omitted).
201. For a discussion of the "compulsive" nature of the oath, see Silving H, supra note 189, at
1573-74.
202. See generally Keefe, Confessions, Admissions and the Recent Curtailment of the Fifth
Amendment Protection, 51 Conn. B.J. 266 (1977); Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth
Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 383 (1977).
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counseled defendant who has made an informed choice to admit his guilt, but
who prefers not to reveal the odious circumstances surrounding his criminal
activity, should be permitted to do so. If the defendant chooses to lie, the
prosecutor may introduce contradictory evidence, if it is available. If the court
becomes aware that the defendant has misrepresented the facts, it may
3
consider that along with all other circumstances at the time of sentencing. 20
The defendant should "have a choice as to whether he [feels] silence or speech
[would] better serve[ ] his interests, taking all logical inferences into account
just as in other ordinary decisions in life."'204 Requiring a defendant to swear
to his guilt in order to finalize a conviction is as reprehensible as the longabandoned oath ex officio, by which the accused was compelled to swear to
his innocence. Administration of the oath to a guilty pleader should, therefore, be discontinued.
Margaret M. Vaughan
203.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976).

204.

Givens, Responding to Violence Through Order and Justice: Evolution of Rules Con-

cerning Interrogation, 14 N.Y.L.F. 780, 790 (1968).

205.

For a discussion of the oath ex officio and its abolition, see L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth

Amendment 266-300 (1968).

